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Proposition 187 and International Human
Rights Law: Illegal Discrimination in the
Right to Education
By STEP-mN KNIGHT*
[W]e declare our firm belief in the principles enunciated in the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights that everyone has the right to
education; that education shall be directed to the full development
of human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding,
tolerance and friendship among the nations, racial or religious
groups and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the
maintenance of peace.
Nelson Mandela, "No Easy Walk to Freedom"1
I. Introduction
On November 8, 1994, Proposition 187 was approved by the vot-
ers of California. If the proposition survives its many legal challenges
and is enforced, basic public services such as social services,2 educa-
* Member of the Class of 1996. B.A. Yale University, 19S7. I would like to thank
Ralph Abascal, Professor Virginia Leary, Dean Preston, W. Reichle, and Steven Ros-n-
baum for their help with this note.
1. Nelson Mandela, No Easy Walk to Freedom, Address (1953), in THE Hu.tsA
RIGHTs READER 317, 319 (Walter Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., 19S9).
2. Proposition 187 adds § 10001.5 to the California Welfare and Institutions CQxle.
The section begins as follows:
(a) In order to carry out the intention of the People of California that only citi-
zens of the United States and aliens lawfully admitted to the United States may
receive the benefits of public social services and to ensure that all p.rsons em-
ployed in the providing of those services shall diligently protect public funds from
misuse, the provisions of this section are adopted.
(b) A person shall not receive any public social services to which he or she may
be otherwise entitled until the legal status of that person has been verified as one
of the following.
(1) A citizen of the United States;
(2) An alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident; or
(3) An alien lawfully admitted for a temporary period of time.
Proposition 187, § 5.
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tion,3 and health care4 would be denied to those persons determined
by state authorities to be in the country in violation of federal immi-
gration laws.
Proposition 187 has already drawn the attention and concern of
the international community. Ernesto Zedillo condemned the initia-
tive in his first appearance as president-elect of Mexico.- Zedillo
noted that "the right to education is a basic universal principle and
therefore all Mexicans must oppose actions that violate this principle,
such as California's Proposition 187.1'6 A special rapporteur on human
rights from the United Nations, visiting the United States in October
1994, reported that Proposition 187 "contains discriminatory and anti-
constitutional provisions, in particular in terms of access to educa-
tion."7 The initiative also stirred up recollections of California's trou-
Proposition 187 was enacted in its entirety at the November 8, 1994 general election
and codified in various California Codes. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 113, 114, 834(b)
(Deering Supp. 1995); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (Deering Supp. 1995); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130 (Deering Supp. 1995); CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48215,
66010.8 (Deering Supp. 1995); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53069.65 (Deering Supp. 1995) [herein-
after "Proposition 187" or "the initiative"].
3. The initiative adds § 48215 to the California Education Code. Paragraph (a)
provides:
(a) No public elementary or secondary school shall admit, or permit the attend-
ance of, any child who is not a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully
admitted as a permanent resident, or a person who is otherwise authorized under
federal law to be present in the United States.
The initiative section also adds § 66010.8 to the Education Code, which among other things
requires:
(a) No public institution of post-secondary education shall admit, enroll, or per-
mit the attendance of any person who is not a citizen of the United States, an
alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident in the United States, or a person
who is otherwise authorized under federal law to be present in the United States.
Proposition 187, § 8.
4. Proposition 187 adds § 130 to Part 1, Division 1 of the California Health and
Safety Code. Paragraph (a) provides:
(a) In order to carry out the intention of the People of California that, excepting
emergency medical care as required by federal law, only citizens of the United
States and aliens lawfully admitted to the United States may receive the benefits
of publicly-funded health care, and to ensure that all persons employed in the
providing of those services shall diligently protect public funds from misuse, the
provisions of this section are adopted.
Proposition 187, § 6.
5. President-elect Condemns California's Proposition 187, BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Nov. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, BBCSWB File.
6. Id.; see also Jeff Franks, Prop. 187 Threatens U.S.-Mexico Ties, Reuters, Nov. 10,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, REUWLD File.
7. Commission on Human Rights, Implementation of the Programme of Action for
the Second Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination: Report by Mr. Maurlce
Glele-Ahanhanzo, Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimi-
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bled history of racial discrimination. "You are the posse, and SOS
[Proposition 187] is the rope," one of its authors told a crowd during
the campaign.' Enforcement of most of the initiative has been stayed
pending trials to determine its constitutionality.9 The education provi-
sions in particular are being challenged as violative of federal and
state guarantees of equal protection, of state and federal privacy guar-
antees, and of international law.10
Even acknowledging the importance of education, the argument
is made that, at a minimum, those persons whose very presence in the
United States is unlawful can fairly be excluded from sharing in the
benefits of membership in American society." "To disqualify aliens is
discrimination indeed," wrote then-Judge Benjamin Cardozo in 1915,
"but not arbitrary discrimination, for the principle of exclusion is the
restriction of the resources of the state to the advancement and profit
of the members of the state. Ungenerous and unwise such discrimina-
tion may be. It is not for that reason unlawful."' 2
In a powerful affirmation of the modern content of the principle
of nondiscrimination, however, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected this
nation, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, U.N. ESCOR, 51st Sess., Provisional Agenda
Item 16, para. 81, U.N. Doc. FCN.41995I7n8Add.1 (1995). See also Daniel Bernheim,
Sunshine State in the Shadow of Shame, GLASGOW HERAL , Nov. 30, 1994, at 10.
8. Patrick J. McDonnell, Prop. 187 Turns Up Heat in U.S. Immigration Debate, LA.
TiraNs, Aug. 10, 1994, at Al. For a brief yet detailed history of the state's extensive record
of racial discrimination, see generally ROBERT HEIZER & AL, tN ALMQoLus, THE OrHR
CALIFORNIANS: PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER SPAIN, M L'FCO AND THE
UNITED STATES TO 1920 (1971).
9. Paul Feldman and Patrick J. McDonnell, U.S. Judge Blocks Most Sections of Prop.
187, L.A. TrmEs, Dec. 15, 1994, at Al; Maura Dolan, Prop. 187 Ban on Higher Education
Blocked, L.A. Tihms, Feb. 9, 1994, at A3. On November 20. 1995, a federal district court
judge found most of the initiative preempted under the Constitution; the ruling is expected
to be appealed. Reynolds Holding, Prop. 187 Ruled Mostly Illegal, S.F. CmrtoN., Nov. 21,
1995, at Al.
10. See e.g., First Amended Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief, League
of United Latin Amer. Citizens v. Pete Wilson, No. 94-7569 (C.D. Cal., filed Nov. 15,1994)
[hereinafter Complaint]; Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Order to
Show Cause re Preliminary Injunction, Jesus Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No.
965090 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1995) [hereinafter Memorandum].
11. See eg., Ben Seeley, Proposition 187 Pro: A Way to Recover Lost Priorities, S.D.
UNioN-TmB., Oct. 20, 1994, at 7; Larry King Live, Transcript #1275 (CNN television
broadcast, Nov. 10,1994) (comments of California Attorney General Dan Lungren), arail-
able in LEXIS, New Library, CNN File.
12. People v. Crane, 108 N.E. 427, 429 (N.Y. 1915), aqld, 239 U.S. 195 (1915), quoted
in Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 373 (1971).
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position in Plyler v. Doe.'3 However, that decision did not address the
nature of the United States legal obligations under international trea-
ties. This Note addresses the argument that the total denial of educa-
tion to a class of persons in the United States is inconsistent with
certain specific obligations of the United States Government under
international law. Part I discusses the status of the right to education
under customary international law. Part II focuses on Proposition 187
as a violation of the International Covenant for Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR or "the Covenant"). 4 The Covenant's requirement of
nondiscrimination is explored in detail. This paper also considers
whether Proposition 187 can lawfully be imposed under the Covenant,
as are the Covenant's provisions pertaining to family, privacy, and
children's rights.
H. The Right to Education in Customary International Law
"A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it
practices, encourages, or condones" a violation of a customary norm
of international law. 15 Customary international law develops from
generally accepted practices which nations follow out of a sense of
legal obligation.' 6 Customary "[i]nternational law is part of our
law,"'1 7 and in the American federal system it takes precedence over
the law of the fifty states.' 8 But the recitation of this phrase just be-
gins the inquiry. In order to be considered customary, an interna-
tional norm must be generally accepted and definable in scope and
content.' 9 The Supreme Court has suggested consulting the following
sources when determining international law: "the works of jurists,
writing professedly on public law; or... the general usage and prac-
13. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). The Supreme Court held in Plyler that Texas
could not refuse a free public education to undocumented children. For a discussion of
Plyler, see text accompanying infra notes 71-72.
14. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171, 6 I.L.M. 368 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, entered into force for the United States
Sept. 8, 1992).
15. REsTATEmENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702 cmt. a (1987) [hereinafter REsTATEmENT].
16. Id
17. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
18. RESTATEmENT, supra note 15, § 111(1). International law is also the law in the
fifty states and is cognizable in state courts. Id. § 111 cmt. d.
19. Id § 702 cmt. a; see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980);
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1543 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
[Vol. 19:183
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tice of nations; or... judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that
law."
20
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,21 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
followed this direction in investigating whether torture constituted a
violation of customary international law. It surveyed a wide array of
international treaties and declarations, starting with the United Na-
tions Charter and including among others the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights,' the American Convention on Human Rights,2
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights?4 The
appellate panel noted that torture was prohibited by at least fifty-five
national constitutions? 5 Finally, the court considered the expert opin-
ions of scholars and the U.S. State Department? 6 "Having examined
the sources from which customary international law is derived.., we
conclude that official torture is now prohibited by the law of
nations."2 7
20. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820); see also The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
provides that in coming to a decision the court is to apply "(a) international conventions
.. ; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) th2
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; and (d) ... judicial d2cisions and
the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists .... ." Statute of the International
Court of Justice, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060 (1945).
21. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 881.
22. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)(A), UN.Doc. A1810.
at 71 (1948) [hereinafter "Universal Declaration"].
23. American Convention on Human Rights, entered into force July 18, 1978, 114
U.N.T.S. 143, 9 I.L.M. 673.
24. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at S81-84.
25. Id. at 884.
26. ld. at 883-85.
27. ld. at 884. Filartiga was recently reaffirmed by the Second Circuit in Kadic v.
Karadzic, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 28826 (2d Cir. Oct. 13, 1995). For other decisions touch-
ing on the enforcement of customary international law, see Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Vil-
kinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980), afd on other grounds, 654 F.2d 132 (10th
Cir. 1981); Ishtyaq v. Nelson, 627 F. Supp. 13.27 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); Garcia-Mir v. Meese,
788 F.2d 1446, 1453-55 (11th Cir. 1986). In the latter case, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the
holding in Rodriguez-Fernandez because of an "obligation of the courts to avoid any ruling
that would 'inhibit the flexibility of the political branches of government to respond to
changing world conditions.... "' Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 70S F2d at 1455 (quoting Mathews
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67,81 (1976)); accord Tartabull v. Thornburgh, 755 F. Supp. 145 (E.D. La.
1990). For a wide-ranging critique of this position, see THo.iAs M. FPANC, POLMCAL
QUESTIONS, JuDIcIaL ANswERs: DoEs THE Rui.n OF L~w APPLY TO ForEXGto AFFAIpR?
(1992).
1995]
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A. International reaties and Education
Applying such a survey to the education field compels the conclu-
sion that the right to education likewise qualifies as a customary norm
of international law. Under the United Nations Charter, each state
has pledged to "promote... universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as
to race, sex, language, or religion." 2 The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights lays the foundation for the modern concept of human
rights. It declares that "[e]veryone has the right to education. Educa-
tion shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental
stages. ' 29 The drafting history of the Universal Declaration indicates
an unusually high degree of agreement in the discussion of this right.30
The basic requirement of nondiscrimination is also emphasized:
"Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
declaration, without distinction of any kind....
The General Assembly has since declared that the rights outlined
in this document constitute "basic principles of international law,"'32
and today-almost a half century after its promulgation-the Univer-
sal Declaration is widely considered to have reached the status of
binding customary international law.33
Numerous other international agreements recognize the right to
education. Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), ratified by 131 nations,'
"recognise[s] the right of everyone to education. '35 The content of
the obligation is spelled out in considerable detail:
28. U.N. CHARTER, art. 55.
29. Universal Declaration, supra note 22, art. 26.
30. See Kate Halvorsen, Notes on the Realization of the Human Right to Education, 12
HUM. Rrs. Q. 341, 349-55 (1990).
31. Universal Declaration, supra note 22, art. 2. For more on nondiscrimination, see
infra text accompanying note 94 et seq.
32. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28,
U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
33. Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather than States, 32 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 17 (1982) ("The Declaration, as an authoritative
listing of human rights, has become a basic component of international customary law,
binding on all states, not only on members of the United Nations."); see also Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980); but see Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Gracey,
809 F.2d 794, 816 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
34. UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY
GENERAL: STATUS AS OF 31 DEC. 1994 107 (1994).
35. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
art. 13(1), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 IL.M. 360 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
[Vol. 19:183
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The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a
view to achieving the full realization of this right:
(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free
to all;
(b) Secondary education in its different forms ...shall be
made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate
means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free
education;
(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on
the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular
by the progressive introduction of free education;
(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified
as far as possible for those persons who have not received or com-
pleted the whole period of their primary education,....6
The ICESCR further requires all states parties to establish full com-
pulsory, free primary education within two years of its ratification.37
The Charter of the Organization of American States ("Charter"
or "OAS Charter"), as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires,
identifies as "basic" the goal of "[r]apid eradication of illiteracy and
expansion of educational opportunities for all ... ,. 2S The Charter, to
which the United States is a party, elaborates on the right to education
in article 47:
The Member States will exert the greatest efforts, in accordance
with their constitutional processes, to ensure the effective exercise
of the right to education, on the following bases:
a) Elementary education, compulsory for children of school
age, shall also be offered to all others who can benefit from it.
When provided by the State it shall be without charge; b) Middle-
level education shall be extended progressively to as much of the
population as possible; and c) Higher education shall be available to
all, provided that, in order to maintain its high level, the corre-
sponding regulatory or academic standards are met.39
36. Ld. art. 13(2). Unfortunately, the Economic, Social and Cultural Committee has
yet to develop the content of the right to education as guaranteed under article 13. The
Committee recently noted its intention to move forward with its interpretations of the
rights under the covenant. Report of the 8th and 9th Sessions, U.N. ESCOR. Supp. No3,
at 20, U.N. Doe. E/C.12/1993/19 (1994).
37. ICESCR, supra note 35, art. 14.
38. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 194., 2 U.S.T. 2416, as
amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, art. 31, 21 U.S.T. 607, 721
U.N.T.S. 324 (entered into force Feb. 27, 1970).
39. Id art. 47.
1995]
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The Charter refers to education in no less than six articles. 0 In article
48, for example, the United States and other signatories agree that
they "will give special attention to the eradication of illiteracy, will
strengthen adult and vocational education systems, and will insure
that the benefits of culture will be available to the entire popula-
tion."' 41 The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
which has been incorporated into the Charter,42 states: "Every person
has the right to an education .... Every person has the right to re-
ceive, free, at least a primary education. 43
States also "recognise the right of the child to education" under
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, "and with a view to achiev-
ing this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they
shall in particular make primary education compulsory and available
free to all.'44 The rapid ratification of this convention by the vast ma-
jority of nations-168 countries became parties in just five years4 5 is
strong evidence of the general acceptance of the right to education.
Of considerable significance is the fact that, during the negotiation of
this treaty, the United States proposed that a country need apply its
protection only to children "lawfully in its territory. '46 This language
was objected to,47 and does not appear in the final draft.
The customary nature of the right to education is further empha-
sized by its recognition in the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,48 the African
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,49 the Declaration of
40. l arts. 45-50.
41. Id. art. 48.
42. Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights
Court, 79 Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (1985).
43. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XII, O.A.S.O.R.,
O.E.AJSer., IJV/Il, 23, Doc. 21, Rev. 2 (English 1975).
44. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 28(1)(a), G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 165, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989).
45. UNITED NATIONS, MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY
GENERAL: STATUS AS OF 31 DEC. 1994 191 (1994).
46. 1981 Working Group, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/L.1575, at 7-10, in THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: A GUIDE TO THE "TRAVAUX
PREPARATOiRES" 142 (Sharon Detrick ed., 1992).
47. Id.
48. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Protocol No. 1, art. 2, openedfor signature Mar. 20, 1952,213 U.N.T.S. 262 (entered
into force May 18, 1954).
49. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, July 11, 1990, OAU Doc.
CAB/LEG/24.9/49, in AFRICAN NETWoRK FOR THE PREVENTION AND PROTECTION
AGAINST CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 12 (Peter Ebigbo ed., 1991).
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the Rights of the Child, 0 and the Convention Against Discrimination
in Education.51 The latter convention commits each party to:
[A] national policy which, by methods appropriate to the circum-
stances and to national usage, will tend to promote equality of op-
portunity and of treatment in the matter of education and in
particular:
(a) To make primary education free and compulsory; make
secondary education in its different forms generally available and
accessible to all; make higher education equally accessible to all on
the basis of individual capacity; assure compliance by all with the
obligation to attend school prescribed by law....sz
None of the above documents or treaties explicitly restricts the right
to an education to citizens.
Additionally, the international community has sought to guaran-
tee educational access to aliens. In 1985, the General Assembly
adopted the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who
Are Not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live,-3 which pro-
tects aliens' right to education.54 The United Nations Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees obligates state parties to grant
refugees "the same treatment as is accorded to nationals with respect
to elementary education. '5 5 Finally, under the International Conven-
50. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 13S6, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sass.,
Supp. No. 16, at 19, U.N. Doc. A14354 (1959).
51. UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Dec. 14, 1960, art. 4,
429 U.N.T.S. 93 (entered into force May 22, 1962) [hereinafter "UNESCO Discrimination
Convention"]. There are 84 parties to the convention. International Instrments Relating
to Human Rights, 16 HuM. Ri-s. LJ. 75, SS (1995).
52. UNESCO Discrimination Convention, supra note 51, art. 4.
53. Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the
Country in Which They Live, G.A. Res. 144, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sss., Supp. No. 53, U.N.
Doc. A/RES401144 (1985).
54. Article 8 provides:
Aliens lawfully residing in the territory of a State shall also enjoy, in accordance
with the national laws, the following rights... :
(c) The right to health protection, medical care, social security, social serv-
ices, education, rest and leisure, provided that they fulfill the requirements under
the relevant regulations for participation and that undue strain is not placed on
the resources of the state.
ILd. art. 8.
55. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art.
22(1), 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. Article 22(2) obligates parties to -accord to refu-
gees treatment as favourable as possible, and, in any event, not less favorable than that
accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, with respect to education other
than elementary education." Id. According to the Supreme Court, when the United States
became a party to the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19
19951
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tion on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of their Families, "[e]ach child of a migrant worker shall
have the basic right of access to education on the basis of equality of
treatment with nationals of the State concerned. 56
The above review of international documents makes clear that
the right to education is very widely recognized under international
law. "Recognized by international conventions, multilateral and bilat-
eral agreements and national legislation, this right is accorded in prin-
ciple to all children, regardless of nationality. ' 57  The obligations
imposed by these international treaties, including several which the
United States has ratified, are hardly consistent with mass expulsion
of undocumented students from public schools across California.
B. Education and the Practice of Nations
Although strongly supportive of the status of the right to educa-
tion, these treaties and instruments constitute just one strand of in-
quiry on the question of the status of a customary norm under
international law. The practice of nations is equally significant in de-
termining whether education is a generally accepted right. "The es-
sence of the existence of a customary norm is the actual practice of
states, undertaken out of a sense of legal obligation."5
Taking the United States as the most relevant example, it is
clearly significant that public education is specifically guaranteed by
the constitution of every state in the union.5 9 The Idaho Constitution
is representative in its forceful declaration of the importance of the
right to education, and the government's duty to provide it: "The sta-
bility of a republican form of government depending mainly upon the
U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, it acceded to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees. See I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987).
56. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of Their Families, adopted Feb. 25, 1991, opened for signature May 2, 1991,
G.A.Res. 45/158, 30 I.L.M. 1517 (1991). This Convention is not yet in force.
57. BARONESS ELLES, INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONS PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS
oF NoN-CrrIZENS para. 242, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/3921Rev.1.
58. Anne Bayefsky & Joan Fitzpatrick, International Human Rights Law in United
States Courts, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 29 (1992).
59. Connie de la Vega, The Right To Equal Education, 11 HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 37,
50 (1994); U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, CIVIL AND POLITICAL Riofrrs IN THE UNITED STATES:
INITIAL REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS CoM.
MIT"EE UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 186
(1994). The possible exceptions are Alabama and Mississippi, which amended their consti-
tutions following the federal desegregation decision of Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954). See de la Vega, supra.
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intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature of
Idaho, to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough sys-
tem of public, free common schools."'6 While the language differs,
other state constitutions are no less explicit in their requirements.
California, for example, provides that "[t]he Legislature shall provide
for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be kept
up and supported in each district .... ,1 The Illinois Constitution
declares that "[a] fundamental goal of the People of the State is the
educational development of all persons to the limits of their capaci-
ties. The state shall provide for an efficient system of high quality
educational institutions and services."62 Analogous language can be
found throughout the states' constitutions. 63 In fact, many states were
admitted to the Union on the condition that they secure the right of
education in their constitutions.6 The United States government de-
clared, in a recent report to the United Nations, that "[a] children in
the United States are entitled, through the laws of each state, to uni-
versal, public, free primary and secondary school education."( 5 The
right to education has been recognized as a fundamental legal obliga-
tion by numerous state supreme courts.6 A recent and dramatic ex-
60. IDAHO CONsT. art. 9, § 1.
61. CAt- CONST. art. X, § 5.
62. hi CO NST. art. 10, § 1.
63. See, eg., COLO. CONST. art. LX, § 2; Ky. Cos'r. § 183; Mr-. Cosr. art. XIII, § 1;
N.J. CoNST. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12; W. VA. Cos;r. art. XII, § 1.
64. Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859,864 n.5 (NV. Va. 1979). The United States hs even
on occasion seen fit to protect by treaty the right of aliens in the United States to an
education. A nineteenth century treaty with China provided:
ARTICLE VII. Citizens of the United States shall enjoy all privileges of the pub-
lie educational institutions under the control of the government of China; and,
reciprocally, Chinese subjects shall enjoy all privileges of the public educational
institutions under the control of the government of the United States, %%hich are
enjoyed in the respective countries by the citizens or subjects of the most favored
nation. The citizens of the United States may freely establish and maintain
schools within the Empire of China at those places where foreigners are by treaty
permitted to reside; and, reciprocally, Chinese subjects may enjoy the same privi-
leges and immunities in the United States.
The Burlingame Treaty, July 28, 1868, U.S.-China, 16 Stat. 739 (1869-71) reprinted in Chae
Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 5$1, 593 (1SS9).
65. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 59, at 186.
66. The cases include Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Robinson v. Ca-
hill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973), cert. denied sub nom., Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U S. 976
(1973); Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Horton
v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1976); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King County v. State, 5.5
P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (V. Va. 1979); Buse v. Smith, 247
N.W.2d 141 (Wise. 1976); Washakie Co. Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 6%- P.2d 310
(Vyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790
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ample of judicial protection of educational rights came in California.
In 1991, facing a budget crisis, the Richmond school district an-
nounced that it would end the school year six weeks early, affecting
over thirty thousand students.67 The California Supreme Court af-
firmed a trial judge's injunction against the closure, ruling that the
state had a constitutional obligation to ensure "basic education equal-
ity" and that "access to a public education is a uniquely fundamental
personal interest in California."68
Just as significant in demonstrating the importance of the right to
education in the United States, however, are the state court opinions
which hold that education is not a "fundamental" right under their
constitutions. These decisions have usually come in the context of liti-
gation over funding inequalities between school districts, rather than
challenging a total denial of education such as Proposition 187. The
decisions often explicitly recognize the importance and mandatory na-
ture of the right to a basic education, if not to a perfectly equal one.
In New York, the Court of Appeals observed that the constitution
"mandated only that the Legislature provide for maintenance and
support of a system of free schools in order that an education might be
available to all the State's children."69 The Maryland Supreme Court
similarly found that the state constitution required the legislature to
provide "a basic public school education ' 70 and the constitution of
Oklahoma was said to guarantee at minimum a "basic, adequate
education."'71
When the U.S. Supreme Court confronted a state's denial of pub-
lic education to undocumented aliens, it squarely held that the equal
protection clause forbids such discrimination. The opinion in Plyler v.
S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989). See also Alexandra Natapoff, 1993: The Year of Living Danger-
ously: State Courts Expand the Right to Education, 92 EDuc. L. REP. 755 (1994); Neville S.
Harris, Education by Right? Breach of the Duty to Provide "Sufficient" Schools, 53 MOD.
L. REV. 525 (1990) (discussing British cases).
67. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Cal. 1992).
68. Id. at 1249.
69. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 368 (N.Y. 1982).
70. Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 776 (Md. 1983).
71. Fair School Fin. Council, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1149 (Okla. 1987). For a
sampling of other decisions finding that education is not "fundamental," see McDaniel v.
Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156 (Ga. 1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635 (Idaho 1975);
Milliken v. Green, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Matter of Levy, 345 N.E.2d 556 (N.Y.
1976), appeal dismissed for want offed'l question, 429 U.S. 805 (1976); Board of Edue. v.
Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Olsen v. State, 554
P.2d 139 (Or. 1976).
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Doe' rests largely on the Court's recognition of the critical impor-
tance of education to all individuals:
Public education is not a 'right' granted to individuals by the Consti-
tution. But neither is it merely some governmental 'benefit' indis-
tinguishable from other forms of social welfare legislation. Both the
importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and
the lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the
distinction.... We have recognized the public schools as a most
vital civic institution for the preservation of a democratic system of
government, and as the primary vehicle for transmitting the values
on which our society rests.... In addition, education provides the
basic tools by which individuals might lead productive lives to the
benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental role in main-
taining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant
social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the
means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order
rests. 73
The U.S. government has highlighted this significant ruling to the in-
ternational community in its report to the United Nations concerning
implementation of the ICCPR, referring to Plyler three times.74
Therefore, under state practice in the United States, at least a
free primary school education is generally accepted as a right. The
United States is not alone in this recognition. Education is recognized
in the constitutions of at least fifty-two nations, including Egypt, Ja-
pan, Morocco, Peru, Poland, and South KoreaYs Article 89 of the
Paraguayan Constitution, for example, requires the provision of a free
public education to all inhabitants on an equal opportunity basis.
Article 27 of Spain's constitution declares: "Everyone has the right to
education.... Basic education is obligatory and free." 77 Many of the
states parties to the ICESCR have submitted reports to the Economic
72. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
73. Id at 221 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
74. U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, supra note 59, at 181.
75. See de la Vega, supra note 59, at 48.
76. lId at 49.
77. CONSTrrciN ESPANOLA [Constitution] art. 27, paras. 1, 4, reprinted in Spain,
XVIII CONsTrrTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF TE WORLD 49 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gis-
bert H. Flanz eds., 1991). Interestingly, the Czech Republic also declares an unrestricted
right to education, but limits free education to citizens. LsnNA Z KLDNICU PpAv A
SVOBOD [Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms], reprinted in The Czech Republic
V CoNsTrruTiONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 161 (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert
H. Flanz eds., 1993).
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and Social Committee7s in which they highlight their commitment to
education. Senegal, for example, emphasized in such a report the
country's constitutional provision "which states that everyone shall
have the right ... to education in the facilities accessible to all."'79
And representatives of the Philippines told the committee that the
"principle of free and compulsory primary education, set out in article
13 of the Covenant, was incorporated into article XVI of the Constitu-
tion [of the Philippines]."80
The provision of education appears to be recognized as an obliga-
tion by the great majority of nations. The practice of states worldwide
provides compelling evidence that education is a generally accepted
right which has reached the status of a customary international norm.
The relatively limited amount of scholarship being done in the
area of the right to education under customary international law is
perhaps the unfortunate consequence of a reluctance to view eco-
nomic and social rights as equivalent to civil and political rights.81 But
those authors who have taken up the question agree that such a right
does exist.'
78. See ICESCR, supra note 35, arts. 16-17.
79. Reports Submitted in Accordance with Council Resolution 1988 (LX) by States Par-
ties to the Covenant, Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 13 to 15, Report of Senegal,
U.N. ESCOR, 1st Regular Sess. of 1983, at 3, U.N. Doc. E/1982/3/Add.17 (1982).
80. Summary of Record of the 8th Meeting, Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights, 4th Sess., 8th mtg., at 6, U.N. Doc. EIC.12/1990/SR.8 (1990) (comments of
Mrs. Bataclan). For other examples of the reports pertaining to education under the
ICESCR, see Reports Submitted in Accordance with Council Resolution 1988 (LX) by
States Parties to the Covenant, Concerning Rights Covered by Articles 13 to 15, Report of
Australia, U.N. ESCOR, 1st Regular Sess. of 1983, U.N. Doc. E/198213/Add.9 (1983); U.N.
Doc. E/1982/3/Add.23 (report of Bulgaria); U.N. Doc. E/1988/5/Add.6 (report of North
Korea); U.N. Doc. E/19885/Add.7 (report of Ecuador); U.N. Do. EI198231Add.31 (re-
port of Nicaragua); U.N. Doc. E/1982/3/Add.27 (report of Portugal).
81. See, eg., Connie de ]a Vega, Protecting Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 15
WHrrrER L. REv. 471,471-72 (1994) ("By ratifying the [ICCPR] without at the same time
ratifying the [ICESCR], the United States contradicted the vast authority in the interna-
tional community which maintains that the enjoyment of both sets of rights is indivisible
and interdependent.") (footnote omitted).
82. See id.; Susan Bitensky, Legal Theory: Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Edu-
cation Under the U.S. Constitution, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 550 (1992); Charles Christopher,
Plyler v. Doe and the Right of Undocumented Alien Children to a Free Public Education, 2
B.U. INT'L L.J. 513 (1984); see also de la Vega, supra note 59.
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C. Is Education a Definable Right?
The question remains whether an education is sufficiently "defin-
able" as to be a customary norm enforceable by the courts.13 While
the specific content of an education will vary greatly, the basic nature
of the right is understood. The contours of the right to education are
specifically defined in the relevant international instruments in a fa-
miliar manner, generally dividing the educational process into elemen-
tary or primary, middle, and higher education.-
Given the widespread agreement in the language of the treaties,
access for all children to free elementary education would appear to
be a legal mandate under customary international law. The Universal
Declaration's statement that "[e]ducation shall be free," for example,
is qualified by "at least in the elementary and fundamental stages."' s
The ICESCR says that a primary education "shall be ... available free
to all"; by contrast, secondary and higher education are to be "accessi-
ble," although the covenant urges the "progressive introduction of
free education. '8 6 The OAS Charter uses similar language.? In addi-
tion, children are the sole focus of several international treaties. The
Convention on the Rights of the Child underlines the importance of
parties making "primary education compulsory and available free to
all."' The denial of a free elementary or primary education to chil-
dren is thus a clear violation of this customary right under interna-
tional law.
While secondary and higher education are defined with less obli-
gatory language, nothing in these documents supports the denial of
any level of education to aliens. Secondary and higher education are
83. The Restatement notes that customary law includes those human rights -%ho7e
scope and content are generally agreed." REsATEmENr, supra note 15, § 702 cmt. a. TheC
Supreme Court of Tennessee recently spoke to a related question:
[T]he word "education" has a definite meaning and needs no modifiers in order
to describe the precise duty imposed upon the legislature. The first definition of
"education" in the unabridged edition of The Random House Dicuonary of the
English Language, 454 (2d ed. 1987) is: -The act or process of imparting or ac-
quiring general knowledge, developing the powers of reasoning and judgment,
and generally of preparing oneself or others intellectually for mature life,"
Contrary to the defendants' assertion, this is an enforceable standard...
Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 150-51 (Tenn. 19?3).
84. See; e.g., OAS Charter, supra note 38, art. 47; ICESCR, supra note 35, art. 13.
85. Universal Declaration, supra note 22, art. 26.
86. ICESCR, supra note 35, art. 13(2).
87. OAS Charter, supra note 38, art. 47.
88. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 44, art. 28(l)(a).
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generally required to be "accessible to all."8 9 The only limitation on
access to higher education specified under the OAS Charter is that "in
order to maintain its high level, the corresponding regulatory or aca-
demic standards are met."' The ICESCR similarly provides that
higher education be "equally accessible to all, on the basis of capac-
ity."91 Given that the drafters of these treaties were quite capable of
limiting the enjoyment of a right to citizens,92 it would appear that
aliens' right to educational access is protected even at the higher
levels, although the state is not required to pay for that education.
In sum, the widespread international recognition of the right to
education in law and in fact has led it to achieve the status of a cus-
tomary norm under international law. The right to a free primary ed-
ucation is given particular emphasis. This norm applies to aliens and
citizens alike. By ordering the expulsion of undocumented alien chil-
dren from California public schools, Proposition 187 violates the
United States obligations with respect to the right to education. This
fact is underscored in the next section with the argument that it is
impossible to implement Proposition 187 in a nondiscriminatory
manner.
II. Proposition 187 as a Violation of the ICCPR
It appears that the right to free elementary education, and to
equal access to higher levels of education, are guaranteed under inter-
national law. "International law and international agreements of the
United States are law of the United States and supreme over the law
of the several States."'93 One reason to appeal to customary interna-
tional law is that U.S. courts have been reluctant to allow a right of
action to individuals under international treaties.94 One treaty which
89. See, eg., ICESCR, supra note 35, art. 13(2); OAS Charter, supra note 38, art. 47;
UNESCO Discrimination Convention, supra note 51, art. 4.
90. OAS Charter, supra note 38, art. 47.
91. ICESCR, supra note 35, art. 13(2).
92. See, eg., ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 25 (right to vote).
93. RESTATEM ENT, supra note 15, § 111(1). This contrasts with the system in the
United Kingdom and Canada, where treaties do not become the law of the land without
express legislative action. Bayefsky & Fitzpatrick, supra note 58, at 47.
94. Cases such as Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d at 881, and Asakura v. City of Seat-
tle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924), represent exceptions, rather than the rule. Judges have developed
the doctrine that international instruments are rarely self-executing, and thus unenforce-
able, in the absence of domestic implementing legislation. One influential test for deter-
mining the status of a particular treaty clause involves a three-step inquiry. The document
is self-executing if the clause "(a) involves the rights and duties of individuals; (b) does not
cover a subject for which legislative action is required by the Constitution; and (c) does not
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the United States has ratified, along with 129 other nations2 s is the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.9 But education
is nowhere mentioned in the ICCPR. Could Proposition 187 violate
this international treaty?
The practical implementation of Proposition 187 raises troubling
questions under several of the Covenant's articles. In particular, there
is a serious question whether the initiative can be implemented in a
manner consistent with the ICCPR's nondiscrimination provisions.
Additionally, law which has developed around the treatment of aliens
under the Covenant poses problems for the initiative's placement ofimmigration enforcement procedures in the hands of schools, health
administrators, and other state authorities. Finally, Proposition 187




Nondiscrimination is a fundamental pillar of international human
rights law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets out the
basic requirement: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and free-
doms set forth in this declaration, without distinction of any kind."' 7
"All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimina-
tion to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to protection
leave discretion to the parties in the application of the particular provision," Stefan Rie-
senfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and GA77 65 A!M. J. I'r-s. L. 543, 550
(1970). Another test looks primarily to the intent of the parties. RESTA-ImiENTr, supra
note 15, § 111(4).
95. UNrITD NAnONS, supra note 34, at 117.
96. The Constitution requires the Senate to concur with the president through its "ad-
vice and consent" by two-thirds vote. U.S. Cosr. art. II, see. 2. The ICCPR %%as ratilied
by the Senate only with a declaration that the treaty was not self-executing. 133 Co:G.
RE S4781-84 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). However, the simple statement that a treaty is non-
self-executing does not absolve the courts of their responsibility under the U.S. Constitu-
tion to decide this question, which is committed to their discretion by Article VI. Stefan
Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and U.S. v. Postal: Win at Any Price?,
74 Am. J. INT'L L. 892, 900-02 (1950). "The intent or understanding of the Executive is at
best an element in the interpretive task of the court." Id. at 901. Nor is a declaration by
one house of Congress binding on the courts. Id. at 901 n.47. -In the absence of a valid
reservation or a joint resolution mandating an authentic interpretation, the proper con-
struction of the domestic effects of a treaty provision rests with the courts." Id. at 9 3 n.45.
Professor Riesenfeld notes that no court has ever squarely held that a declaration by the
President or the Senate can nullify the effect of a properly enacted treaty. Id at 901.
97. Universal Declaration, supra note 22, art. 2.
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against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration .... ,,98 The
prohibition on discrimination applies "in law or in practice in any field
regulated and protected by public authorities." 99 The principle of
nondiscrimination is binding on all members of the United Nations."°
The prohibition against unlawful discrimination protects citizens
and aliens alike. The original focus of international law was on states,
rather than individuals, as actors.1 1 As a result, an injury to an alien
abroad was subsumed into an injury against the alien's country of na-
tionality, and any remedy was restricted to the field of bilateral inter-
national relations.' 2 In the modern era, with the focus of
international human rights concern clearly on the individual, the pro-
tection of aliens has been transformed.
What the international community is witnessing today is a major
change-the significance of which cannot be overstated-in the way
in which the rights of aliens are protected: from the classic system of
diplomatic protection ... to the direct protection of the individual
alien's rights through his use of national and international proce-
dures to enforce a set of reformulated international norms .... 103
The change in focus in international law is exemplified by the U.N.
Charter's guarantee of "human rights and fundamental freedoms" to
all.1°4 As the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has observed,
the "objective and purpose [of human rights treaties] is the protection
of the basic rights of individual human beings, irrespective of their
nationality, both against the State of their nationality and all other
contracting states." 05
Of course, it does not immediately follow that every distinction
between citizens and aliens constitutes a violation of international law.
International instruments recognize, however, that such distinctions
are not necessarily permitted. Protection for aliens under nondiscrim-
98. Id. art. 7.
99. S.W.M. Broeks v. Netherlands, Communication No. 172/1984, para. 12.3, reprinted
in HUMAN RIGHTS CoMM-rrEE, SELECTED DECISIONS UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL
196, U.N. Doc. CCPR/COP/2 (1990); see also DOMINIC McGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMrfIE para. 4.57 (1993). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 143-46
and accompanying text.
100. THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS ACROSS BORDERS para. 3.01 (Louis B. Sohn &
Thomas Buergenthal eds., 1992).
101. RICHARD B. LILLICH, THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN CONTEMPORARY INTER.
NATIONAL LAW 1 (1984).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 3.
104. U.N. CHARTER, art. 55.
105. Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 1, para. 29, ser. A/no.2 (1982).
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ination provisions can be found in a wide range of international
documents.
Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not
specifically address the subject of aliens, the rights and freedoms it
describes are guaranteed to "everyone" and to "all human beings."'' 6
Under any plain interpretation of this language, the Universal Decla-
ration would apply to aliens and citizens alike. The OAS Charter obli-
gates the United States to exercise jurisdiction "equally over all the
inhabitants, whether nationals or aliens."' ' 7 The rights provided for in
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man are to be
accorded "without distinction as to race, sex, language, creed, or any
other factor." ' Discrimination against refugees is barred by article
three of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Ref-
ugees." 9 The American Convention on Human Rights proscribes dis-
crimination based upon a person's "national or social origin, economic
status, birth, or any other social condition.""' UNESCO has adopted
the Convention Against Discrimination in Education;"' pursuant to
article 3, "the States Parties thereto undertake: ... (e) To give foreign
nationals resident within their territory the same access to education
as that given their own nationals.""' And under the International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of their Families:
Access to public pre-school educational institutions or schools shall
not be refused or limited by reason of the irregular situation with
respect to stay or employment of either parent or by reason of the
irregularity of the child's stay in the State of employment.113
Notwithstanding this broad array of documents protecting the
rights of noncitizens, the continuing uncertain status of the alien under
106. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 22, arts. 1-3 ("All human beings are
born free and equal."; "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration."; "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.").
107. OAS Charter, supra note 38, art. 12.
108. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, supra note 43, art. II.
109. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 55, art.
3.
110. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 23, art. 1(1).
111. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, supra note 51, art. 3.
112. Id. art. 3.
113. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of their Families, supra note 56, art. 30. Under article 7, nations "undertake
... to respect and ensure to all migrant workers and members of their families within their
territory or subject to their jurisdiction the rights provided for in the present Convention
without distinction of any kind such as... nationality." Id. art. 7.
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international law is demonstrated by the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), to
which the United States is a party.114 In one of the most comprehen-
sive legal declarations against discrimination, the convention defines
racial discrimination as:
[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race,
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose
or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other
field of public life.115
Parties to the convention condemn racial discrimination "in all its
forms. '' " 6 However, the CERD flatly declares that it "shall not apply
to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State
Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens.""' 7 Yet
the authoritative interpretation of this provision notes that it "must
not.., detract in any way from the rights and freedoms recognized
and enunciated in other instruments, especially the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, the [ICESCR], and the [ICCPR]." 8 Any
other understanding would suggest the untenable position that the
convention tolerates racial discrimination against aliens.'1 9
To answer the question of Proposition 187's conflict with interna-
tional human rights, therefore, one must look to the "International
Bill of Rights"-the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
ICESCR, the ICCPR, and the ICCPR's Optional Protocol.120 The
114. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195,5 I.L.M. 352 (entered into force
Jan. 4, 1969, entered into force for the United States Jan. 21, 1995). The convention was
ratified by 94 parties as of 1993; the United States ratified the treaty in 1994.
115. Id art. 1(1).
116. Id art. 2(1).
117. Id. art. 1(2). The Convention adds that it should not be interpreted so as to affect
"in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning nationality, citizenship or
naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against any particular
nationality." Id. art. 1(3).
118. Human Rights Commission, General Recommendation XI on Non-citizens, 42nd
Sess., at 66, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1993).
119. In a case brought under the racial discrimination convention, however, France's
denial of bar admission to a Senagalese lawyer based on his non-citizen status was deemed
not to constitute racial discrimination due to article 1, paragraph 2. Demba Talibe Diop v.
France, Case No. 2/1989; see MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLIT.
ICAL RiOHTs: CCPR COMMENTARY, art. 2, para. 44 n.125 (1993).
120. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, at 59, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, 6 I.L.M. 383 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). The
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civil and political covenant in particular, to which the United States is
bound, provides a developed body of nondiscrimination law which
supporters of the anti-immigrant initiative will have to confront.
2. Nondiscrimination Under the ICCPR
The "principle of equality and the prohibition of discrimination,"
observes one commentator, "runs like a red thread throughout the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. '2 The document's signifi-
cance for the fights of aliens has been cited as one of its major fea-
tures.1' The ICCPR, which was expressly intended to make legally
binding the human rights outlined in the Universal Declaration, 1'
generally makes no distinctions or limitations on the availability of the
rights it contains. The substantive articles use differing but nonethe-
less clear terms such as "[e]veryone,"' 124 "[e]very child,"12 "[all per-
sons," 26 "all individuals,"1 27 and "[e]very human being. 'lzS
In addition, the document was framed against a background of a
considerable body of international law relating to the treatment of
aliens.129 The language of the covenant indicates an understanding of
this background. Article 25 of the ICCPR, for example, expressly re-
stricts the enjoyment of the right to vote and to take part in public
affairs to citizens.13 0 Article 13--covering expulsion-applies solely
to legal aliens, and article 12's right to liberty of movement and resi-
dence is expressly restricted to those "lawfully within the territory of a
State."'13 "The inescapable conclusion is that aliens are generally coy-
Optional Protocol, which has fifty state parties, allows individuals to bring claimed viola-
tions of the ICCPR before the Human Rights Commission. See McGot.Drzc % supra note
99, para. 4.7.
121. NowAx, supra note 119, art. 26, para. 6.
122. McGOLDRICK, supra note 99, para. 135.
123. Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer, Introduction, in U.S. RIovTiFATIo; oF THE
INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HuNAN RIGHTS 7 (Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer
eds., 1993).
124. ICCPR, supra note 14, arts. 16, 17, 18, 19, & 22; see also ICESCR, supra note 35,
arts. 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, & 15.
125. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 24.
126. Id. art. 26; see also ICESCR, supra note 35, art. 13.
127. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 2.
128. Id. art. 6.
129. For brief surveys of the history of the treatment of aliens under international law,
see ELLES, supra note 57, at 1-4; LnncH, supra note 101, at 5-20.
130. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 25.
131. Id. art. 12(1). The article pertains to freedom of movement and the right to chooasa
a residence.
19951
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
ered.' 32 It is therefore apparent that discrimination against aliens
must at least be subject to scrutiny under the ICCPR.
As a signatory to the ICCPR, the United States "undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, with-
out distinction of any kind .... ,,33 This obligation is spelled out in
article 2. Additionally, the covenant provides that "[e]veryone shall
have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the
law."'134 In its interpretation of the ICCPR, the Human Rights Com-
mittee (HRC)135 has observed that the civil and political rights de-
tailed therein generally "apply to everyone... irrespective of his or
her nationality. 1 136 "[T]he general rule is that each one of the rights
of the Covenant must be guaranteed without discrimination between
citizens and aliens.' 37 The nature of the obligation toward aliens
under the ICCPR is explored by the Committee in some detail:
The Covenant does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or
reside in the territory of a State party. It is in principle a matter for
the State to decide who it will admit to its territory. However, in
certain circumstances an alien may enjoy the protection of the Cove-
nant even in relation to entry or residence, for example, when consid-
erations of non-discrimination, prohibition of inhuman treatment
and respect for family life arise.
[O]nce aliens are allowed to enter the territory of a State party
they are entitled to the rights set out in the Covenant.
[A]liens have the full right to liberty and security of the per-
son.... They may not be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful inter-
ference with their privacy, family, home or correspondence....
Their children are entitled to those measures of protection required
by their status as minors.... Aliens are entitled to equal protection
by the law. There shall be no discrimination between aliens and
citizens in the application of these rights. These rights of aliens may
132. LILLICH, supra note 101, at 145.
133. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 2.1 (emphasis added).
134. Id. art. 16.
135. The Human Rights Committee is a body of 18 experts created by the ICCPR to
receive reports by state parties and to hear complaints from individuals under the Optional
Protocol. ICCPR, supra note 14, arts. 28-45; see generally McGOLDRICK, supra note 99,
paras. 2.1-2.22. McGoldrick describes the HRC as having "judicial, quasi-judicial, adminis-
trative, investigative, supervisory and conciliatory functions." Id. para. 2.22.
136. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 15, 27th Sess., para. 2, at 20, HRI/
GEN/1/Rev.1 (1986). For a discussion of the significance of the HRC's comments, see
McGoLDmicK, supra note 99, paras. 3.34-3.38.
137. Human Rights Committee, supra note 136, para. 2, at 20.
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be qualified only by such limitations as may be lawfully imposed
under the Covenant. 13S
Finally, the Covenant's article 20(2) prohibits "advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrim-
ination."'139
However, the protections under article 2 are limited to the rights
"recognized" in the Covenant, as evidenced by the HRC's reference
to "these rights." Education is not expressly protected under the
ICCPR. But the Covenant has an additional article pertaining to non-
discrimination, and it is clearly broader in scope. Article 26 contains
language mandating equality before the law, equal protection of the
law, and nondiscrimination:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect,
the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all per-
sons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other
status.14o
The HRC has found that the prohibition against discrimination en-
compasses "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which
is based on any ground.., which has the purpose or effect of nullify-
ing or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons,
on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms."''
Article 26 has serious implications for Proposition 187. The pro-
vision bars illegal discrimination in the implementation of publicly-
administered programs. In its discussion of state parties' obligations
with regard to determinations of aliens' legal status, the Committee
observed that this article:
[D]oes not merely duplicate the guarantee already provided for in
article 2 but provides in itself an autonomous right. It prohibits dis-
138. Id. paras. 5-7 (emphasis added). 'his comment essentially restates the Human
Rights Committee's holding that the ICCPR was violated by a discriminatory changa in a
state party's immigration laws. The Mauritian Women Case, Communication No. 3511978,
reprinted in HuiAN RIGHTS CommIrrrn, SELECrED DECISIONS UNDER THE OPToI.
PROTOCOL 67, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985). For a full discussion of this important
case, see infra text accompanying note 197-203.
139. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 20(2).
140. l& art. 26.
141. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18, Non.discrimination, 37th Sass.,
para. 7, at 27, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1989). This does not mean, of course, that identical
treatment is required. Id. para. 8.
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crimination in law or in fact in any field regulated and protected by
public authorities.... Thus, when legislation is adopted by a State
party, it must comply with the requirement of article 26 that its con-
tent should not be discriminatory. In other words, the application of
the principle of non-discrimination contained in article 26 is not lim-
ited to those rights which are provided for in the Covenant.142
The HRC developed this significant interpretation of the ICCPR
in the context of two cases brought against the Netherlands under the
treaty's Optional Protocol. The disputes centered around gender dis-
tinctions made in the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act.143 The act
prohibited married women from receiving benefits unless they could
demonstrate that they were "breadwinners," a requirement not placed
on married men.144 The Netherlands argued that the claim could not
be brought under the ICCPR because it involved social security,
which is an economic right covered by the ICESCR. 145 The Commit-
tee rejected this defense as inconsistent with the language of article
26, and found the discrimination unreasonable:
Although article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrim-
ination, it does not of itself contain any obligation with respect to
matters that may be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not,
for example, require any State to enact legislation to provide for
social security. However, when such legislation is adopted in the
exercise of a State's sovereign power, then such legislation must
comply with article 26 of the Covenant.' 46
142. Human Rights Committee, supra note 141, para. 12, at 28 (emphasis added).
143. S.W.M. Broeks v. Netherlands, Communication No. 172/1984, reprinted in HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMITTEE, SELECTED DECISIONS UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL 196, U.N.
Doe. CCPRICIOP/2 (1990); F.H. Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, Communication No. 182/
1984, reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE, SELECTED DECISIONS UNDER THE OP-
TIONAL PROTOCOL 209, U.N. Doe. CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990); see also NOWAn, supra note 119,
art. 26, para. 21.
144. NOWAK, supra note 119 art. 26, para. 21; McGOLDRICK, supra note 99, paras. 4.56-
57.
145. See, e.g., F.H. Zwaan-de Vries v. Netherlands, para. 8.3, supra note 143, at 211-12;
see also McGOLDRICK, supra note 99, para. 4.56.
146. S.W.M. Broeks v. Netherlands, para. 12.4, supra note 143, at 201; F.H. Zwaan-de
Vries v. Netherlands, para. 12.4, supra note 143, at 213; see also MCGOLDRICK, supra note
99, para. 4.57. This rationale is fully in conformity with the Supreme Court's holding in
Plyler that aliens were not exempt from equal protection simply due to their undocu-
mented status. As restated by one district court, Plyler held that "if a free public education
is offered by the state, it must be made available on equal terms to everyone." Pena v.
Board of Educ., 620 F. Supp. 293, 300 (N.D. Ga. 1985). Compare the HRC's reasoning
with that of the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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Thus, notwithstanding that the ICCPR does not guarantee the right to
education, it does prohibit discrimination in the provision of that
right, where provided by the state.
The Committee also found that a policy which froze the pensions
of retired French soldiers of Senegalese nationality after that country
gained its independence violated the ICCPR. 47 Responding to the
French government's defense, it was noted that "mere administrative
convenience or the possibility of some abuse of pension rights cannot
be invoked to justify unequal treatment. '1 4 s Nationality is thus estab-
lished under "other status" as a ground of discrimination prohibited
by the ICCPR.
The Human Rights Committee has articulated a standard for re-
viewing legislation challenged as discriminatory under the Covenant.
In general, a particular distinction will not be found discriminatory if
the criteria "are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a
purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant."1 49 To meet its bur-
den under the Committee's scrutiny, a state will have to make a show-
ing based on convincing evidence.150 While its exact scope remains
unclear, this standard of review would appear to be stricter than the
minimal "rational basis" standard applied to most equal protection
claims in U.S. courts. In ratifying the ICCPR, however, the Senate
attached the following reservation:
The Constitution and laws of the United States guarantee all per-
sons equal protection of the law and provide extensive protections
against discrimination.... The United States understands distinc-
tions based upon race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or any other
status-as those terms are used in Article 2, paragraph 1 and Arti-
cle 26-to be permitted when such distinctions are, at minimum,
rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective. 51
One commentator has noted that should this reservation be "accepted
by other States Parties, the United States will have engrafted into the
system of the Covenant... the most permissive criterion allowed by
147. Gueye et al. v. France, Communication No. 19611985, reprinted in McGoLDaCa:,
supra note 99, para. 6.29.1; see NowAx, supra note 119, art. 26, para. 22.
148. Gueye et al. v. France, Communication No. 19611985, reprinted in McGoaDRAc-:,
supra note 99, para. 629.1.
149. Human Rights Committee, supra note 141, para. 13, at 28.
150. McGoLDRicx, supra note 99, para. 629.1.
151. S. ExEc RF,. No. 123, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1992).
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its domestic law."' 52 But the reservation does not appear to bar the
application of a stricter standard of review.
The Human Rights Committee's interpretation of article 26 as an
autonomous right is consistent with language of the article as well as
the understanding of the drafters of the ICCPR.153 There is no ques-
tion that article 26 therefore has far-reaching implications. "[I]t may
cover, for example, taxation, the whole range of social security and
welfare legislation, and immigration.' 1 54 In fact, the German govern-
ment ratified the Covenant's First Optional Protocol with a reserva-
tion which seeks to avoid just such a result.' 55  Yet such broad
implications are inherent in the guarantees of equal protection and
equality before the law. "The Covenant contains no provision grant-
ing a right to sit on a park bench. But when a State Party enacts a law
forbidding Jews or blacks from sitting on public park benches, then
this law violates Art. 26.11156 The United States may not be obligated
by the ICCPR to provide a general system of public education, but it
cannot lawfully discriminate against aliens once it affirmatively offers
this public service.
B. The ICCPR and Aliens
The ICCPR is not blind to the issue of aliens who are unlawfully
within the territory of a state. The United States obligations related to
152. Oscar M. Garibaldi, The Principles of Non-discrimination and Equality Before the
Law, in U.S. RATIFICATION, supra note 123, at 68. The Human Rights Committee has
made clear its own concern with "the extent of the state party's reservations, declarations
and understandings to the Covenant. It believes that, taken together, they intended to
ensure that the United States has accepted what is already the law of the United States."
Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Ar-
ticle 40 of the Covenant, 53rd Sess., para. 14, CCPR/CI79/Add. 50 (1995).
153. See NowAK, supra note 119, art. 26, paras. 8-12 n.40.
154. McGOLDRICK, supra note 99, para. 4.58. See also THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS
ACROSS BORDERS, supra note 100, paras. 3.01-04; Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.
1982).
155. The German reservation reads in part:
[T]he competence of the Committee shall not apply to communication... (c) by
means of which a violation of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is repri-
manded, if and insofar as the reprimanded violation refers to rights other than
those guaranteed under the aforementioned Covenant.
reprinted in McGOLDRICK, supra note 99, at xlvii. But as McGoldrick notes, "The Human
Rights Committee never makes a finding of violation of a right other than those guaran-
teed under the Covenant." ld. He expresses "grave doubts about the validity of the Ger-
man reservation. It could gravely damage the integrity of the Human Rights Committee
under the Covenant. That should be viewed as being contrary to the object and purpose of
the First Optional Protocol." Id.
156. NowAK, supra note 119, art. 26, para. 12.
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expulsion and deportation under article 13 are expressly limited to
aliens lawfully present in the country:
An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to the present
Covenant may be expelled therefrom only in pursuance of a deci-
sion reached in accordance with law and shall, except where com-
pelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to
submit the reasons against his expulsion and to have his case re-
viewed by, and be represented for the purpose before, the compe-
tent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the
competent authority. 157
The Human Rights Committee has said that it is only "once aliens are
allowed to enter the territory of a State party [that] they are entitled
to the rights set out in the Covenant."' 'ls The question of lawful pres-
ence is to be determined under national law.' 9
The plain language of article 13 might be read by negative impli-
cation to approve the expulsion of undocumented aliens in any man-
ner, even if not "in accordance with law." But such a reading could
conflict with other provisions of the ICCPR, including article 9 ("Eve-
ryone has the right to liberty and security of person.... No one shall
be deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance
with such procedure as are established by law,")LY article 14 ("All
persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals,") 161 and article
16 ("Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a per-
son before the law."). 62 More generally, it would not be consistent
with basic principles of human rights to simply declare a class of per-
sons totally unprotected. The Committee has not done so:
[I]f the legality of an alien's entry or stay is in dispute, any decision
on this point leading to his expulsion or deportation ought to be
taken in accordance with article 13. It is for the competent authori-
ties of the State party, in good faith and in the exercise of their
powers, to apply and interpret the domestic law, observing, how-
ever, such requirements under the Covenant as equality before the
law (art. 26).163
157. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 13.
158. Human Rights Committee, supra note 136, par. 6, at 19.
159. Id.
160. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 9(1).
161. Id. art. 14(1).
162. Id. art. 16.
163. Human Rights Committee, supra note 136, para. 10, at 21.
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Furthermore, in considering the United States report under the Cove-
nant, the HRC expressed concern "that excludable aliens are dealt
with by lower standards of due process than other aliens."'164 This au-
thoritative interpretation of the ICCPR raises a fundamental problem
for the implementation of Proposition 187. The initiative measure im-
properly delegates to school teachers, health administrators, and other
state officials the authority to "to apply and interpret the domestic
law" relating to legal presence in the United States.1 65 For example,
the initiative requires school districts to report to the authorities "any
enrollee or pupil, or parent or guardian, attending a public elementary
or secondary school in the school district determined or reasonably
suspected to be in violation of federal immigration laws." 166 The initi-
ative further provides for a primary or secondary school student's ex-
pulsion ninety days after she is "determined or reasonably suspected"
of being undocumented. 67 But there is nothing about a person's im-
migration status which is readily discernable to the untrained ob-
server. "Explicit in the measure's wording is that interrogators must
rely on suspicion. With dozens of official immigration categories, only
qualified U.S. authorities can determine status with certainty. ' 'l 6s
School administrators are manifestly not "competent authorities" to
make such a determination. "California public school officials lack
the training and expertise to determine whether public school children
or their parents are lawfully within the United States as a matter of
federal immigration law."'1 69
This is particularly the case given the expertise required to inter-
pret the many convoluted questions which make up a person's status
under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). "[S]ome immigra-
tion laws are very complex," the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice (INS) observes on the form for determining whether an employee
is eligible to work. 70 Federal judges have, more colorfully, compared
164. Human Rights Committee, supra note 152, para. 18.
165. Human Rights Committee, supra note 136, para. 10, at 21.
166. Proposition 187, supra note 2, § 7 (adding § 48215(e) to the California Education
Code); see also id. § 8, relating to public post-secondary educational institutions, which
requires reporting-to the INS, the state attorney general and the superintendent of public
instruction-of any person "under reasonable suspicion of being" in violation of the fed-
eral immigration laws.
167. Proposition 187, supra note 2, § 7(e).
168. McDonnell, supra note 8, at Al.
169. See, eg., Complaint, supra note 10, para. 54.
170. INS Form 1-9, "Employment Eligibility Verification."
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the INA to "King Minos's labyrinth in Ancient Crete." 171 As the U.S.
Supreme Court has noted:
Until an undocumented alien is ordered deported by the Federal
Government, no State can be assured that the alien will not be
found to have a federal permission to reside in the country, perhaps
even as a citizen. Indeed, even the Immigration and Naturalization
Service cannot predict with certainty whether any individual alien
has a right to reside in the country until deportation proceedings
have run their course. 172
Proposition 187 "allows a lay bureaucrat to make an immigration sta-
tus determination without any training .... Once such a bureaucrat
suspects a student is here in violation of federal law, the student re-
ceives what is tantamount to an official order to depart the
country."'173
Under Proposition 187 a student "reasonably suspected" by a
school official to be without the proper immigration status will be ex-
pelled ninety days after the suspicion is reported, whether or not there
has been any verification from competent authorities.74 Even if a
school official were to correctly identify a student as presently un-
documented, expel or refuse to admit her, and inform the INS, there is
no guarantee that she would be deported. Instead, she may remain
and eventually regularize her status. "[T]he illegal alien of today may
well be the legal alien of tomorrow.' 75 Alternatively, the school may
make mistakes and expel legal residents or U.S. citizens. A significant
number of these children may be unable to provide the required docu-
171. Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 813 F.2d 283, 292 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Lok v. INS, 545
F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977)), affd en banc, 838 F.2d 1020 (9th Cir. 19B3).
172. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 247 n.6 (19S2) (Fowell, J., concurring); sce also id. at
226 (majority opinion) ("there is no assurance that a child subject to deportation %%ill ever
be deported. An illegal entrant might be granted federal permission to continue to reside
in this country, or even to become a citizen. In light of the discretionary federal pover to
grant relief from deportation, a State cannot realistically determine that any particular
undocumented child will in fact be deported until after deportation proceedings have been
completed. It would of course be most difficult for the State to justify a denial of education
to a child enjoying an inchoate federal permission to remain.") (citations omitted).
173. Memorandum, supra note 10, at 22.
174. Proposition 187, supra note 2, § 7 (adding § 4215(e) to the California Education
Code). Identical requirements are imposed on providers of publicly-funded health care
and social services. Id. § 5-6.
175. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 207 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 45S F. Supp. 569, 577 (E.D.
Tex. 1978)).
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mentation in time to avoid expulsion. 176 A mistaken deprivation of
education will cause serious and permanent injury.
Peter Schey and Carlos Holguin made a similar point against the
ban on hiring undocumented persons imposed by the Immigration Re-
form and Control Act of 1986:177 "The Government's prerogative to
control the borders is not disputed. Employers should not be forced,
however, to affirmatively participate in border control efforts of
highly questionable effectiveness which also cause injury to domestic
and foreign workers alike.' 178 This position gains still more force if
one replaces "employers" with "school officials" and "workers" with
"students." As the plaintiffs argue in the lower education challenge to
the Initiative:
Proposition 187 provides no definition of "persons who are other-
wise authorized under federal law to be present in the United
States," nor does it attach any procedural safeguards to public
school officials' verification of children's federal immigration status.
As a direct and proximate result.., substantial numbers of U.S.
citizens and immigrants with a legal right to remain in the United
States will be erroneously excluded from the public schools. 179
Finally, Proposition 187 requires school districts to verify the im-
migration status of each parent or guardian of every student.18 This
provision encourages the indirect expulsion of U.S. citizen and legal
resident children through the deportation of their parents. Courts
have generally declined to halt the deportation of the undocumented
parents of U.S. citizen children.' 8' But such an action could be a vio-
lation of the protection accorded to family under the ICCPR.
C. The ICCPR and Family Life
The ICCPR recognizes the importance of the family to the indi-
vidual. "The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of soci-
ety and is entitled to protection by society and the State." 182 Article
176. Compare Peter Schey & Carlos Holguin, Employer Sanctions Deserve No Am-
nesty, in XII IN DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN 177 (Lydio F. Tomasi ed., 1990) (noting that "most
agencies give a low priority to responding to requests for certified copies of such public
records and often take months or even years to respond to such requests.").
177. Immigration Reform and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986).
178. Schey & Holguin, supra note 176, at 170-71.
179. Complaint, supra note 10, para. 53.
180. Proposition 187, supra note 2, § 7(d).
181. See generally Bill Piatt, Born as Second Class Citizens in the U.S.A.: Children of
Undocumented Parents, 63 NOTRE DAME L. RIv. 35 (1988).
182. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 23.
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17 of the Covenant provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbi-
trary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or corre-
spondence."'' s "Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks."' 14 Proposition 187's interfer-
ence with privacy rights is evident in the central role which that argu-
ment has taken in the challenges to the initiative's educational
provisions.ls" "[Proposition 187] would test legal and ethical stan-
dards of confidentiality, particularly for doctors, nurses, social workers
and others whose professions are steeped in privacy."I SO
The Covenant's broad protections and guarantees for children
can also be included under the general category of family. Pursuant to
the United States obligations under article 24(1) of the ICCPR:
Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour,
sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth,
the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status
as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the state.1' 7
The Covenant's protection of the family life of aliens is made explicit
by the Human Rights Committee: "[I]n certain circumstances an alien
may enjoy the protection of the Covenant even in relation to entry or
residence, for example, when considerations of non-discrimination,
prohibition of inhuman treatment and respect for family life arise."'IFS
Article 24 may be one of the covenant's broadest and most pro-
tective substantive rights. However, it is worth comparing the
enumeration of protected grounds under this article to that under arti-
cle 26, which prohibits discrimination on grounds "such as race, col-
our, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth, or other status."189 The grounds for pro-
tection of children under the Covenant are not broadly prefaced by
the phrase "such as," nor do they extend to opinions or to "other sta-
tus." In discussing article 24, the Human Rights Committee has nev-
ertheless declared that "states parties should indicate how legislation
and practice ensure that measures of protection are aimed at remov-
ing all discrimination in every field... particularly as between chil-
183. ld. art. 17.
184. 1&
185. See, e.g., Memorandum, supra note 10, at 27-34.
186. McDonnell, supra note 8, at Al.
187. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 24.
188. Human Rights Committee, supra note 136, para. 5, at 19.
189. ICCPR, supra note 14, art. 26.
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dren who are nationals and children who are aliens." 190 The
Committee added that "the measures to be adopted are not specified
and it is for each State to determine them .... [S]uch measures,
although intended primarily to ensure that children fully enjoy other
rights enunciated in the covenant, may also be economic, social, or
cultural."'191 Inasmuch as specific legislative action has been taken in
compliance with obligations under article 24-such as the establish-
ment of compulsory free public schools-it could violate the ICCPR
to take affirmative action to deprive a class of children such
protection. 19
Proposition 187 raises other questions pertaining to the United
States obligation to respect family life under the Covenant. The initia-
tive's education provisions require elementary and secondary schools
to report undocumented parents of U.S. citizen students to the INS
for deportation. 193 The family life of spouses, siblings, and parents of
undocumented persons will therefore be affected by the anti-immi-
grant initiative. But the impact of Proposition 187 is unlikely to be
confined to the families of the undocumented persons at whom it is
targeted. As discussed above, school officials are not competent to
determine which students are legally present under the federal immi-
gration laws.' 94 As a result, it is inevitable that their enforcement of
the proposition will result in considerable injury to documented immi-
grants and U.S. citizens. A United Nations Special Rapporteur, visit-
ing the United States in October 1994 as part of a mission on racial
intolerance, remarked on "the overall climate of hostility towards im-
migrants prevailing in California" and made specific reference to
Proposition 187 and to Plyler v. Doe.95 In the words of a 27-year INS
veteran: "There is no question in my mind that there will be rampant
discrimination in enforcement."' 96
Several decisions have been made by the Human Rights Commit-
tee touching on the issues of nondiscrimination and respect for family
190. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 17, 35th Sess., para. 5, at 23, U.N.
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1989).
191. Id
192. The argument is analogous to the Supreme Court's recognition in Griffin v. Illi-
nois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), that although an appeal was not constitutionally guaranteed, once
a system of appeals was provided it could not be operated so as to discriminate against the
indigent.
193. Proposition 187, supra note 2, § 7(e).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 158-78.
195. Commission on Human Rights, supra note 7, para. 81.
196. Gustafson Declaration, para. 5 in Memorandum, supra note 10, at 23.
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life in relation to the treatment of aliens. A tightening of immigration
legislation by a state party in the 1970s, for example, was found to be a
discriminatory interference with family life under the ICCPR.197 In
that case, the government of Mauritius moved to limit the residency
status of aliens in a discriminatory manner.19s "[U]nder the new laws,
alien husbands of Mauritian women lost their residence status ....
The new laws, however, do not affect the status of alien women mar-
ried to Mauritian husbands."'199 A group of Mauritian women
brought a claim before the Committee alleging that the change in im-
migration law was discriminatory on the basis of sex in violation of
articles 2, 17, 23, and 26 of the Covenant. The government countered
that the law did not violate any right protected by the ICCPR because
the Covenant does not guarantee any alien the right to enter or stay in
a country.
As the HRC noted, however, the claim was "not concerned pri-
marily with the rights of non-citizens (foreign husbands) but of Mauri-
tian citizens (wives). "2° The government of Mauritius countered that
there was no violation of the ICCPR's protection of family life as the
aliens' wives could live abroad with their husbands."' The Human
Rights Committee disagreed:
[T]he exclusion of a person from a country where close members of
his family are living can amount to an interference within the mean-
ing of article 17. In principle, article 17(1) applies also when one of
the spouses is an alien. Whether the existence and application of
immigration laws affecting the residence of a family member is com-
patible with the Covenant depends on whether such interference is
either "arbitrary or unlawful" as stated in article 17(1), or conflicts
in any other way with the State party's obligations under the
Covenant 02
The legislation was found to be an arbitrary violation of the principle
of equal treatment of the sexes in violation of article 26 and other
provisions of the ICCPR.203 The fact that the legislation in question
involved immigration, a subject not directly covered by the Covenant,
was of no consequence. "In the present cases, not only the future pos-
197. The Mauritian Women Case, supra note 13S; see also NowAn:. supra note 119, art.
17, para. 29.
198. The Mauritian Women Case, supra note 13S, para. 12.
199. Id.
200. ld. para. 6.2.
201. Id. para. 5.4.
202. I& para. 92(b)(2)(i)(2).
203. Id. para. 10.1.
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sibility of deportation, but the existing precarious residence situation
of foreign husbands in Mauritius represents, in the opinion of the
Committee, an interference by the authorities of the State party with
the family life of the Mauritian wives and their husbands. '20 4
In A.S. v. Canada, the HRC faced the claim that a state party's
refusal to permit an individual's family members to enter the country
violated the Covenant.20 5 The complaining party, a naturalized Cana-
dian born in Poland, sought permission for her daughter and grandson
to join her. °6 Her request was denied on various statutory grounds,
and she turned to the Human Rights Committee, which analyzed the
claim that her family had a right to join her under articles 12, 17, 23,
and 26 of the ICCPR.2 °7 In finding the case inadmissible, the Human
Rights Committee significantly did not hold that such a right did not
exist, but agreed with Canada that "after 17 years of separation, fam-
ily life did not exist, and the State was not obligated to re-establish
conditions of family life .... Articles 17 and 23 are "not applica-
ble since, except for a brief period of 2 years some 17 years ago, A.S.
and her adopted daughter have not lived together as a family."20 9
Supporters of Proposition 187 might argue that if Congress can
require employers to verify the status of every employee, California
can do the same for its public school students. Yet Congress was very
aware of the danger of discrimination when it enacted the Immigra-
204. Id. para. 9.2(b)(2)(i)(3). Compare the decision of the European Court of Human
Rights involving a similar claim brought against the United Kingdom's immigration poli-
cies by three British women separated from their husbands in the case Abdulaziz, Cabaies
and Balkandali. For a discussion of the case, see Anne Owers, Immigration, in HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 18, 23-24 (Paul Sieghart ed., 1988). The policy, which
weighed more heavily on those petitioning for the entry of husbands than wives, was
"designed to bear particularly harshly on husbands from the Indian sub-continent." Id. at
23. The women's claim tied together the provisions of the European Convention for the
Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms pertaining to family life and nondiscrimi-
nation with respect to race and sex. European Convention for the Protection of Funda-
mental Rights and Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 8 & 14, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into
force Sept. 3, 1953 as amended by Protocol No. 3, entered into force Sept. 21, 1970, and
Protocol No. 5, entered into force Dec. 21, 1971). The European Court upheld their claim
on the ground that it involved impermissible sex discrimination.
205. A.S. v. Canada, Communication No. 68/1980, reprinted in HUMAN RiOhTrs CoM.
MITTEE, SELECTED DECISIONS UNDER THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL 27, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
OP/i (1985).
206. Id. paras. 1-2.
207. Id. paras. 3-4.
208. Id. para. 5.1.
209. Id. para. 8.2(b); see also NowAK, supra note 119, art. 17, para. 29.
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tion Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986.210 IRCA made it ile-
gal to employ a person who is unauthorized to be in the United
States.21' Although the logical result of such a measure was to make
"the hiring situation ripe for discrimination on account of national ori-
gin and citizenship status,'' 12 Congress made clear that "every effort
must be taken to minimize the potentiality of discrimination."213 Em-
phasizing the importance of this mandate, the law included a special
antidiscrimination section,214 created an "office of special counsel" to
prosecute employment discrimination cases,21 5 and directed the Gen-
eral Accounting Office (GAO) to issue annual reports to Congress on
the discriminatory impact of the sanctions.216 "These efforts reflect
Congress' deep concern that employers might use IRCA employment
restrictions as a pretext to discriminate on the basis of race."217
Implementation of the ICRA has nevertheless led to increased
discrimination. In the GAO's 1988 study of discrimination in IRCA
enforcement, it found that "about 16 percent, or 528,000 employers
who were aware of the law, had begun unfair employment prac-
tices. 218 By the time of its final report in 1990, nineteen percent of
employers polled "admitted to engaging in some form of discrimina-
tory employment practice as a result of employer sanctions."-2 19 Other
210. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986).
211. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (1988 & Supp. 111990).
212. Nancy S. Cowen, The Employer's Dilemma Under IRCA: Is It Possible to Comply
With 1-9 Requirements Without Discriminating?, 6 GEo. I, %MIGR. LJ. 285, 289 (1992).
213. H.R. REP,. No. 682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 45, 68 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5672.
214. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (1986).
215. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(c) (1986).
216. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(j)(1)(A) (1986).
217. Schey & Holguin, supra note 176, at 174. A similar concern is evident in the legis-
lative history to the statutory bar on undocumented aliens' receipt of aid under the Food
Stamp Act. "Effective and efficient administration of this reporting requirement demands
the utmost in caution and concern for human rights as well as sensitivity to the serious
harm caused by subconscious as well as conscious prejudice and discrimination." H.R.
REP. No. 788,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, at 137 (19S0), reprinted in 19S0 U.S.C.C.A.N 843,970.
See Doe v. Miller, 573 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. 1I1. 1983).
218. Arnold P. Jones, Report on the Implementation of Employer Sanctions, in XII IN
DEr'NsE OF THE ALIEN 135, 136 (Lydio F. Tomasi ed., 1990). The GAO nevertheless
concluded that this did not constitute a "pattern of discrimination." Id.
219. Cowen, supra note 212, at 287 n.14; U.S. GENERAL AccouNnNc OFrcE, ImMi.
oRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANrONs AND THE Quso4 OF DiscmNIINAVTON,
GAOIGGD-90-62 (Mar. 1990).
1995]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
research has found that four in ten employers felt that the sanctions
made it riskier for them to hire Asians and Latinos. 220
These disturbing findings in the employment context emphasize a
further intolerable cost to Proposition 187 enforcement: the discrimi-
natory impact on U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents.
Although Proposition 187 would appear no less likely to cause dis-
crimination than would IRCA, the initiative contains nothing similar
to the detailed anti-discriminatory provisions found in IRCA. This
indicates a simple lack of concern for this important issue. By analogy
to the experience with employer sanctions, Proposition 187 could well
result in fifteen to twenty percent of all schools adopting practices
which will illegally discriminate against legal permanent resident and
citizen children of certain ethnic backgrounds.
Applying municipal law, judges in the United States have been
sensitive to the possibility of injury to citizens from state efforts to
discourage illegal immigration by denying access to benefits. A fed-
eral court in Illinois enjoined the denial of food stamps to undocu-
mented aliens with U.S. citizen children.221 The California Supreme
Court expanded Plyler to cover the denial of welfare to U.S. citizens
with undocumented siblings;-, a state effort to deny health care to the
citizen child with undocumented parents was invalidated by the Idaho
Supreme Court.223 And a federal court blocked a regulation barring
Housing and Urban Development Department subsidies for citizens
and legal residents who live with undocumented persons.224
A major focus of the litigation against Proposition 187 is the fact
that many of the people targeted for expulsion from school are related
to legal residents of the United States, often including U.S. citizens.
In the lower education case filed in federal court in California,215 sev-
eral of the children plaintiffs are in this situation. One fourteen-year-
old's father "is a lawful permanent resident of the United States [who]
pays local, state and federal taxes, and has fied a petition to have [his
son] accorded the status of a lawful permanent resident of the United
220. Lina M. Avidan, Employment and Hiring Practices Under IRCA: A Survey of San
Francisco Businesses 1989, cited in Cowen, supra note 212, at 292 n.46.
221. Doe v. Miller, 573 F. Supp. 461 (N.D. II1. 1983).
222. Darces v. Woods, 679 P.2d 458 (Cal. 1984).
223. Intermountain Health Care, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs of Blaine County, 707 P.2d
1051 (Idaho 1985). Note that the judiciary is much more reluctant to intervene to protect
U.S. citizen children when the issue involves the deportation of their parents. See generally
Piatt, supra note 180.
224. Piatt, supra note 181, at 39.
225. Complaint, supra note 10.
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States. However, it will take at least three years before plaintiff wNill
receive permanent residence."' 2 6 The plaintiffs challenging the higher
education provisions of Proposition 187 similarly note that "[w]hile
many of their family members are U.S. citizens or legal permanent
residents, they themselves are not yet authorized to be in the United
States. In short, they are undocumented, but documentable." -7 The
inevitable interference with family life caused by the expulsion from
school of undocumented children, siblings, and other relatives of law-
ful permanent residents and U.S. citizens should be found to be a vio-
lation of the United States obligations under the Covenant.
IV. Conclusion
Proposition 187 can thus be seen as a violation both of customary
international law and of the International Covenant for Civil and
Political Rights. All elementary and secondary school children, at
least, have a right to a free public education. No exception based on
lawful presence is evident under international treaties; on the con-
trary, such an exception was rejected in the drafting of the Convention
on the Rights of the Child. Additionally, Proposition 187 is in conflict
with several provisions of the ICCPR, including rights to privacy,
proper adjudication of status, and-perhaps most importantly-the
right to nondiscrimination. The expulsion or denial of admission to
undocumented students as well as citizen children of undocumented
parents cannot be implemented without trampling on these and other
persons civil and political rights guaranteed under this important in-
ternational treaty, to which the United States is bound.
The dire consequences of the second class status often accorded
economic and social rights is well illustrated by Proposition 187. Cer-
tainly no court would hesitate to find unconstitutional a law which
deprived undocumented aliens of the right to a trial, or denied them
the right to associate or to practice their religion. Education is cer-
tainly no less significant a human right. "Learning is a public good.
Higher education in particular is a process that everyone should be
able to enjoy and whose fruits redound to society as a whole."2' 3 It
does not make sense to deny an education to someone, or to some-
one's child, simply because that person did not follow the proper for-
malities in crossing the border, or because his temporary permission
226. Id. para. 23.
227. Memorandum, supra note 10, at 4-5.
228. SAmumL Bow.ns Er AL., AFrER mE WAsVLAND 210 (1990).
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to stay has lapsed." 9 California has acknowledged the significance of
education by making it a fundamental right. California courts and leg-
islators will likely find it difficult to manage a regime under which a
student's access to a fundamental constitutional right depends on
something as fluid as her status under federal immigration laws.
International law is of more than academic relevance to the ques-
tion of the treatment of aliens; no matter what their immigration sta-
tus, these people are the citizens of another sovereign nation. Any
domestic law pertaining to the treatment of aliens touches on interna-
tional law. U.S. courts may well refuse to strike down Proposition 187
on the grounds that it violates an international human rights treaty.
However, the extensive body of authority in international law protect-
ing the rights of aliens should provide the courts with significant per-
suasive authority as they confront the legality of the mass expulsion of
alien children from public schools. Proposition 187 cannot stand in
the face of its conflict with a broad spectrum of international legal
obligations and with principles respected by the community of na-
tions. Nor can it be squared with basic notions of fundamental fair-
ness and equity under U.S. equal protection doctrine. Particularly in
light of a history of mistreatment of aliens in California, this state
should not lead the United States and the international community
towards a regime of uncertainty for the many persons around the
world who do not reside in their nation of citizenship.
229. From a domestic perspective, the anti-immigrant fever sweeping the United States
might seem strange to some given the role played by immigration in U.S. history and the
favored national symbolism of the Statue of Liberty. But the ever-tightening efforts to
control the border with Mexico (however illusory in fact) make it appear logical to many
people to increase the harsh legal consequences for those persons who do not follow the
proscribed procedures. Richard Lillich has observed that ancient Greece, despite a tradi-
tion of generous hospitality, also had harsh anti-alien laws. His example "illustrates with
great clarity the point that legal disabilities of aliens are frequently a function not so much
(or, at any rate, not exclusively) of fear or hatred as of the inherent logic of the prevailing
political/legal order." LILLIcH, supra note 101, at 5. This perspective helps to explain
some of the recent debate in the United States. Until recently, applying the inherent logic
of a legal system built to protect individual rights, judges generally applied to undocu-
mented persons a wide range of protections available to all persons under the law. See,
eg., Local 512, Warehouse and Officers Workers Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 718 n.12
(9th Cir. 1986). In the wake of employer sanctions, however, the decisions are beginning
to cut the other way. See, eg., Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 876 F.2d 1115 (7th Cir.
1992). Here, the "inherent logic" of the legal system begins to be twisted beyond recogni-
tion. For surely the goal of protecting jobs for citizens-a major focus of immigration
restrictions and the expressed goal of employer sanctions-is poorly served by depriving
undocumented workers of any remedy. "When we deny backpay to illegal aliens, we tell
employers to hire more of them." Id. at 1125 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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